Where the sector figures come from.

With $1.08B of FY 2023 sector revenue and a 75% credit-card share, the sector processes ~$807M in card volume each year.

• Stripe default cost: 2.2% × $807M + $0.30 × 10.8M txns = $21M/yr
• Stax subscription: 1.55% interchange × $807M + $0.16 × 10.8M + $1,188/yr = $14M/yr
• Difference: $7M/yr

Editable, with your org's own volume + avg-gift + processor mix: Payment-processor calculator →

When a donor sells an appreciated stock for cash and then donates, they pay long-term capital-gains tax (typically 15–20%) on the appreciation before the charity receives the money. When they donate the appreciated stock directly, the charity receives the full pre-tax value and the donor still gets the full fair-market-value deduction.

The tax that gets paid on the sold-stock path doesn't vanish — it flows into the US federal general fund, where the largest discretionary line item is the Department of Defense. By preferring cash-from-sold-stock over direct stock gifting, Muslim donors are unintentionally routing tens of millions of dollars per year into the same general fund that finances foreign-military operations our community is most affected by.

• What we measure: from the cohort's Form 990s (Part I line 1c, non-cash contributions) and a scan of donor pages for stock-acceptance disclosure, the Muslim US 501(c)(3) cohort receives almost nothing as non-cash gifts — well under 1% of contributions. Most orgs have no way to accept appreciated securities at all.
• What we assume (modeling): if even a modest share of the sector's major cash gifts were instead given as appreciated assets directly, the capital-gains tax paid on the sell-then-donate path wouldn't be paid. Applying a blended 15–20% long-term capital-gains rate to that migratable share puts the leakage on the order of ~1.2% of sector revenue.
• This is an illustrative, order-of-magnitude figure — not a measurement, and not anchored to any external benchmark for the “normal” non-cash share. It sizes a channel the cohort barely uses today; the real number can't be measured precisely without donor-side records.

The Ihsan Standard Stock-Acceptance Audit helps orgs set up direct-securities receipt so the per-org share can actually be tracked.

Planned giving — bequests in wills, charitable remainder trusts, life-insurance and retirement-account beneficiary designations — is a large, slow-to-build channel that the Muslim cohort has barely started on. A donor's wasiyya is often the single largest gift they ever make.

• What we measure: from cohort Form 990s (Part VIII line 1f, bequest contributions) and a scan of donor pages for an estate-planning / wasiyya program, the Muslim US nonprofit cohort currently realizes well under 1% of revenue from planned giving — and most orgs have no wasiyya pipeline at all.
• What we assume (modeling): we size the unrealized opportunity at up to ~7% of revenue as an illustrative upper bound — the kind of pipeline a well-run planned-giving program can build over years.
• This is an Ihsan Standard estimate — not a measured figure, and not a cited third-party benchmark. It sizes a pipeline the cohort hasn't built yet; the realized amount depends entirely on donor education and the programs orgs put in place.

The gap is donor-education-driven, not regulatory. The Ihsan Standards Wasiyya Audit helps orgs build the donor-facing pipeline.

Many US Muslim nonprofits, often through inherited site templates or default platform setups, route donor-facing operations through vendors whose ethics are in clear conflict with the community they serve. Two surfaces in particular:

• Israel-aligned platforms. Wix is an Israeli company (Tel Aviv-headquartered) operating in a state that the International Court of Justice and dozens of UN special rapporteurs have found plausibly complicit in genocide against Palestinians ([ICJ Case 192]). Vercel's founder has made public statements supporting Israel during the same period. Routing Muslim donor money through these companies — even indirectly through hosting — is a material ethical conflict.
• Surveillance-implicated SSO + tracking pixels. Default “Sign in with Google” and “Sign in with Facebook” widgets, plus the Meta Pixel and TikTok Pixel embedded on donor flows, hand donor identity to parent companies whose data has been repeatedly subpoenaed by US security agencies ([Google transparency report] [Meta]). The same companies hold US/Israeli defense contracts (Google & Amazon are Project Nimbus contractors with the Israeli Ministry of Defense).

The point isn't whether this is “$5M/year” or “$50M/year” — it's that a Muslim nonprofit's donor relationship shouldn't be running through software stacks that conflict with the values the donors give for. Detection is live on every org page (filter Wix · Vercel · Google SSO). The Supplier-Stack Audit produces a vendor-by-vendor switch plan.

Most Muslim nonprofits buy hosting, payment processing, accounting, CRM, insurance, and physical-plant services from non-Muslim vendors — often without checking whether a Muslim-community alternative meets or beats market rates. This is the community-procurement gap: $1 spent inside the community circulates ~3–7× before leaving (per the multiplier effect studies on local-economy procurement).

• Conservative estimate: 3% of sector operating spend has a quality-matched Muslim-community alternative currently unused.
• At $1.08B sector revenue (a rough proxy for operating spend at the high end): ~$32M/yr exiting the community economy when it didn't have to.

Mapping each org's vendor stack to Muslim-community alternatives at comparable cost is part of the engagement-track Ethical Supplier Stack Audit, offered at no org cost during the pilot.